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Grondgedraagde swamsiektes – die wortel van
alle kwaad
AKTUEEL
/
RELEVANT
65
Sewe-stap miljoenêrsplan vir dames
66 Political analysis:
South African politics in a holding pattern
68
Global research network ensures better hybrids
69
No place for weakest links
71 Graan SA/Sasol fotokompetisie:
Reik (jou kamera) na die sterre
72
It’s all about changing lives
73
Topbul haal hoogste prys op veiling
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Suksesse in grondhervorming op databank vasgelê – Agri SA
76
Opbrengskompetisie se gewildheid neem toe
RUBRIEKE
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FEATURES
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Graan SA Standpunt:
Wat staan ons te doen?
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Grain SA Point of View:
What are we to do?
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Uit die Woord
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Op die kantlyn
79 Wiele vir die plaas:
Nuwe Renault Duster EDC is nou outomaties
80 E-posse:
Die bok
Die Graanprodusent van die Jaar-toekenning
(waarvan Syngenta die hoofborg is) is in
Oktober vanjaar oorhandig.
Foto: Helenus Kruger
3
Voorblad
/
Cover
017
South African politics
in a holding pattern
H
istory will probably look back at
2017 and refer to it as the year in
which South Africa was caught
in a perfect political and economic
storm. Apart from the two stepchildren of
government policy, i.e. agriculture andmin-
ing, very few sectors recorded economic
growth.
Due to record crops in maize, soybeans
and sunflower, aswell as amodestupswing
in the global commodity cycle, it is safe
to say that these two sectors prevented
the country from more than a technical
recession.
Politically the fragmentation of the ruling
ANC into at least two factions causedpoliti-
cal paralysis in decision-making and confu-
sion in policy development. South Africa
became a victim of the worst of political
infighting, suffering very detrimental politi-
cal decisions, such as the cabinet reshuffle
in which Minister Pravin Gordhan lost his
job as Minister of Finance, with his brave
battle against state capture and corruption
recorded ashisonly sin.
The perfect storm was a storm of low
economic growth coupled with policy un-
certainty linked to a volatile currency and
factionalism in thegoverningparty.
This new normal is often referred to as
a VUCA world. The VUCA concept fits
South Africa like a glove at the moment.
The first letter of this abbreviation stands
for
volatility
and our currency, the rand, is
a very good examplewith its almost unpre-
dictable swings. The second letter stands
for
uncertainty
and the ANC’s leadership
contestation and subsequent policy paraly-
sis fitnicely into this slot.
In VUCA the third letter represents
com-
plexity
and managing a country with an
unemployment rate of 27,7% and youth
unemployment reaching 50%
illustrates
the complexity of policy formation and the
subsequent financing thereof. Land reform
also fits thisbill.
The last letter in the VUCA word is
ambi-
guity
. Ambiguity is the degree to which
information, situations and events can be
interpreted in multiple ways. Ambiguity
increases doubt, slows decision-making,
and results in missed opportunities (and
threats).
In analysing
the political economy of
South Africa towards the end of 2017, it is
useful to lookatdevelopmentsasavirtuous
cycle and a vicious cycle, because not eve-
rything is allbadoronlygood.
The virtuous cycle represents all those ac-
tions and decisions that bring South Afri-
canscloser toeachother in formingaSouth
African political culture. In this ‘good cycle’
that searches for themiddle; there are also
negative issues atwork, but they are domi-
natedby thepositives.
In the vicious cycle, however, the negatives
likecrime,corruptionandmaladministration
dominate thegood intentionsof the change
efforts. These two cycles engage very dy-
namically and findexpression in the reports
of theAuditorGeneral,ThePublicProtector,
several court cases andpolicydecisions.
November 2017
RELEVANT
THEOVENTER,
political and policy specialist,
NWUSchool ofBusiness andGovernance,North-WestUniversity
POLITICAL
analysis
September 2017 on the competitive nature
of 137 countries in 2017/2018, needs a
closer look. As part of the perfect storm
mentioned earlier, SouthAfrica dropped 14
places among137 countries from47thmost
competitiveeconomy to the61stmost com-
petitivenation.
These 14 places that we have lost is the
most significant drop since the start of
this annual survey in 2004. What caused
thisdrop so suddenly in 2017?
Looking at the different pillarmeasures, it
becomes clear that we have lost our com-
petitiveness because of financial institu-
tions and the integrity of our corporate
governance. Itused tobe among thebest in
the world, but dropped from 11/138 to
44/137 in 2017/2018.
Another reason for the drop in competi-
tiveness was that of institutions of state.
Previously we scored 40/138 and now it
dropped to 67/137. Both numbers show a
global decline in confidence in financial ar-
rangement and governance (KPMG and the
i
)
llas
due to issues such as institutionalised cor-
ruption and state capture allegations.
In addition, the WEF Global Competitive
Report publishes a list of issuesmaking it
difficult to do business in a country. For
years the normal culprits in South Africa
were things such as restrictive labour rela-
tions, inefficient government bureaucracy,
inadequate infrastructure, policy instability
and inadequately educatedworkforce, top-
ping the list.
The 2017/2018
list brings new
issues
to the fore and the top five now are:
Corruption, crime and theft, government
instability/coups, tax rates and insufficient
governmentbureaucracy.
It is in the context illustrated above that
the ANC is preparing for a leadership elec-
tion inDecember 2017. The intensity of the
leadership contest, aswell as theuncertain-
ty about President Jacob Zuma’s exit strat-
egy, causeshugepoliticaluncertainty.
Figure 1
is an outline of the two roles
oftheANCinpolitics.Firstly, it is a politi-
governandsecondly itconstitutesagovern-
ment (Blue).
From this figure it is clear that theANC has
not succeeded in closing the gap between
electing its leadership for the political party
(December 2017) and forming a govern-
ment after an election (May 2019).
This lack of synchronisation between party
leadership and governing leadership (presi-
dent and cabinet) has created the notion of
‘two centresofpower’within theANC. It re-
fers toone leadership team inLuthuliHouse
and a different team sitting in the Union
Buildings. This scenario caused the ‘recall’
ofPresidentThaboMbeki in 2008, a scenar-
io thatmayplay itselfout again in 2018with
regards toPresidentZuma.
At its 54th National Conference, arranged
for 16 to 21 December 2017, the ANC will
have to do three important things. Firstly, it
will have to amend its constitution, then it
will have to amend and approve its policy
framework and lastly elect the leadership
for thenext five years.
President Zuma indicated that he is not re-
electable as president of the ANC and his
second term as State President will also
come toanend inMay2019.
Figure2
shows
the different possible candidates for the
ANC election inDecember 2017.
Uncertainty about who will succeed Presi-
dent Zuma has added to the perfect poli-
tical and economic storm in South Africa
– especially due to the corruption charges
and state capture allegations linked to the
Zumapresidency.
At this stage two candidates are looking
like frontrunners, i.e. the Deputy President,
Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, and the ex-wife of
President Zuma, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma.
ANC traditionwould favour the sitting dep-
uty president to take over from President
Zuma in December 2017, but the deep run-
ning factions in theANCmakes this predic-
tion extremely difficult. This uncertainty
adds to the view that SouthAfrican politics
is currently in a holding pattern due to un-
certainty and this situationwill continue at
leastuntil lateDecember2017andmayonly
2018
Figure 2:Differentpossible candidates for theANC election inDecember 2017.
0
POLITICAL ANALYSIS
66