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THE

GRAIN AND OILSEED INDUSTRY

OF SOUTH AFRICA – A JOURNEY THROUGH TIME

ႃႄ

On 31 December 2015 the following contracts were traded on Safex:

Contract

Date listed

White maize WM1

March 1996

White maize WM2

July 2000

Yellow maize YM1

March 1996

Yellow maize YM2

July 2000

Wheat

November 1997

Sunflower

February 1999

Soy

April 2002

Transport differential

The transport differential introduced with the establishment of Safex reflects the

transport costs component that is taken into account in pricing. It represents the

transport costs for transporting grain from different localities to Randfontein.

Safex used Randfontein as the point of reference for determining the transport

differential because of the large volumes of grain that were processed there. The

transport differential for each Safex point of delivery was then calculated with the

transport component as basis and deducted from the Safex price to determine a

basis price at each silo.

Initially the transport differential was calculated mainly with respect to the cost

of rail transport, as most of the grain was transported by rail. Rail transport was

cheaper than road transport, so that as the volumes of grain transported by road

increased, the cost component was increased accordingly. Likewise, the increase

in the price of diesel as well as the higher maintenance costs of trucks due to the

poor condition of roads in time led to a higher transport differential.

Infrastructure

After the deregulation of the markets in 1996 and the accompanying changes in

production volumes in certain isolated and marginal areas, several of the silos and

rail infrastructure established in the period of controlled marketing basically fell

into disuse, while a greater concentration of storage developed in other areas.

With deregulation the storage capacity was virtually totally under the control of

the former agricultural co-operatives. Allegations were made that the storage

facilities abused their dominance with respect to storage capacity to apply un-

competitive practices. One of the biggest storage facilities of maize at the time,

Senwes, was in fact accused by the Competition Commission that they had

abused their dominant position in the provision of storage capacity. With the

introduction of alternative storage facilities after deregulation, e.g. silo bags and

grain dams, traders had other options than just the concrete silos of the former co-

operatives and the silo owner would probably no longer find it easy to dominate

the market for storage.

Agribusinesses

One of the biggest adjustments for producers shortly after deregulation was the

change in their relationship with agribusinesses. Since the start of controlled market-

ing in South Africa in the 1930s agricultural co-operatives played a very important

role in the grain industry. The co-operatives, which were owned and controlled by

producers, functioned as agents of the control boards, which were the only legal

marketers of grain. Grain producers conducted all their grain business through the

agribusinesses (co-operatives). The producers therefore focused on production,

while the control boards marketed their products.

However, with the commencement of the 1996 Act the position changed com-

pletely and producers had to manage the marketing of their products themselves.

The commencement of the 1996 Act and accompanying abolition of the market-

ing councils also meant that the role of agribusinesses as agents of the marketing